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Standard Oil Rises Again: How Eroding
Legal Protections and Lax Regulatory
Oversight Harm Consumers*
By Tyson Slocum'
Introduction
Recent legislative and regulatory changes have weakened
government oversight of oil and natural gas markets, and have re-
* This article is partly a compilation of statements and testimony made on be-
half of Public Citizen, including: Causes and Solutions of New Jersey's High Gaso-
line Prices: Hearing before the New Jersey Assembly Transportation Committee
(2005) [hereinafter New Jersey's High Gasoline Prices], (Testimony of Tyson
Slocum, Research Director of Public Citizen's Energy Program), available at
http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy/o5Fenviro%5Fnuclear/electricity/Oil%5Fand
%5FGas/articles.cfm?ID=14156 (last visited Apr 23, 2007);. The Need for Stronger
Regulation of U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Hearing before the House Government
Reform subcommittee on Energy and Resources (2005) [hereinafter The Need for
Stronger Regulation of U.S. Natural Gas Markets] (Testimony of Tyson Slocum,
Research Director of Public Citizen's Energy Program), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Natural%20Gas%20Testimony.pdf, (last visited
Apr. 23, 2007); and Consumer Concerns with Natural Gas and LNG: Hearing be-
fore the Competition, Foreign Commerce and Infrastructure of the U.S. Senate
committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2004) [hereinafter Con-
sumer Concerns with Natural Gas] (Testimony of Wenoah Hauter, Director of
Public Citizen's Energy Program), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
NatGasTestimonyl0-04.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2007). Further, the author par-
ticipated in a panel presentation concerning these topics at the Federal Trade
Comm., Energy Markets in the 21 st Century (Apr. 10-12, 2007).
+ Director, Public Citizen's Energy Program. Public Citizen is a national, non-
profit consumer advocacy organization founded in 1971 to represent consumer in-
terests in Congress, the executive branch and the courts. Public Citizen's energy
program safeguards consumers from the impacts of electricity deregula-
tion, educates the public on the dangers of nuclear power while encouraging re-
sponsible nuclear waste management, and fights against environmental degradation
by promoting clean energy alternatives. For more information, please visit
www.publiccitizen.org.
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suited in a greater ability of energy companies to engage in anti-
competitive behavior. This article will explore these changes and
provide some reform options to help restore basic consumer protec-
tions in the energy marketplace.
Since 2001, the largest five oil companies operating in the
United States-ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, ConocoPhillips, BP
and Shell-recorded $464 billion in profits.' While some of their
profit clearly stems from certain aspects of global supply and de-
mand, investigations show that a portion of these record earnings are
fueled by market manipulation, made possible by recent mergers2 and
weak regulatory oversight by the federal government.3
Energy trading markets, where prices of oil and gasoline are
set, were recently deregulated, providing new opportunities for oil
companies and financial firms to manipulate prices.4 Investigations
show that energy trading firms have not only exploited recently
weakened regulatory oversight, but a new trend of energy traders
controlling energy infrastructure assets, like pipelines and storage fa-
cilities, provides additional abilities to use "insider" information to
help manipulate markets.5
A wave of mergers in the oil and gas industry, has led to
greater levels of market power and industry consolidation, thereby
making anti-competitive practices by a handful of oil companies in-
creasingly possible.6 As industry consolidation has reached a peak,
the recently strong bias of in the antitrust area in favor of a rule of
reason rather than a per se analysis of alleged anticompetitive con-
duct, weakened anti-trust enforcement.7 This judicial weakening of
anti-trust law, combined with lax regulatory oversight by the US
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), allowed oil companies to merge
operations and forge joint partnerships that undermine effective com-
' Public Citizen calculations from company financial reports filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.
2 New Jersey High Gasoline Prices I, supra note 1.
3 The Role Of Market Speculation In Rising Oil And Gas Prices: A Need To
Put The Cop Back On The Beat, Staff Report prepared by the Perm. Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the U.S. Senate, June 27, 2006, found at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_congsenate committeeprints&docid=f:28640.pdf
See discussion infra Section III
See discussion infra Section II
6 New Jersey's High Gasoline Prices, supra note 1.
7 See discussion infra Section III and IV
2007] 413
Loyola Consumer Law Review
petition in domestic downstream oil markets. 8
I. Energy Trading Abuses Require Stronger Oversight
Two regulatory lapses are enabling anti-competitive practices
in energy trading markets where prices of energy are set. First, oil
companies, investment banks and hedge funds are exploiting recently
deregulated energy trading markets to manipulate energy prices.
9
Second, energy traders are speculating information gleaned from
their own company' s energy infrastructure affiliates, a type of legal
"insider trading."
1
Contrary to some public opinion, oil prices are not set by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); rather,
prices are determined every day by the actions of investment banks
hedge funds and oil company energy traders in the energy markets. If
Historically, most crude oil has been purchased through either fixed-
term contracts or on the "spot" market.' 2 Long-standing futures mar-
kets exist for crude oil, led by the New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) and London's International Petroleum Exchange, which
was acquired in 2001 by an Atlanta-based electronic over-the-counter
(OTC) exchange, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).13 NYMEX is
a floor exchangeregulated by the U.S Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC). 14  The futures market historically serves to
hed e risks against price volatility and also serves for price discov-
ery. Only a tiny fraction of futures trades result in the physical de-
8 See discussion infra Section III
9 STAFF OF THE PERM, SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 1 0 9
T
H CONG., REPORT ON
THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION IN RISING OIL AND GAS PRICES: A NEED To
PUT THE CoP BACK ON THE BEAT, [hereinafter, THE ROLE OF MARKET
SPECULATION] available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname= 109 cong_senate committee prints&docid-28640.pdf (last visited Apr.
23, 2007).
1o See discussion infra Section II.
"1 See New Jersey High Gasoline Prices supra note 1. THE ROLE OF MARKET
SPECULATION, supra note 9.
12 THE ROLE OF MARKET,SPECULATION supra note 9.
13 ICE - History, https://www.theice.com/history.jhtml (last visited Apr. 20,
2007); NYMEX - An Introduction, http://www.nymex.com/intro.aspx (last visited
April 20, 2007).
14 THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION, supra note 9, at 4.
15 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 10 9 th Cong.
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livery of crude oil. 16
The CFTC enforces the Commodity Exchange Act, which
gives the Commission authority to investigate and prosecute market
manipulation. 17  But after a series of deregulation moves by the
CFTC and Congress, the futures markets, over the last few years,
have increasingly been driven by the unregulated OTC market., The
deregulated OTC markets serve more as purely speculative markets,
rather than the traditional volatility hedging or price discovery be-
cause the lack of reulation invites companies to engage in anti-
competitive practices. 9 And more importantly, this new speculative
activity is occurring outside the regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC.2 °
Energy trading markets were deregulated in two steps: first, in
1993, the CFTC regulatory process began, and second, Congressional
action followed in 200021.
In response to a petition by nine energy and financial compa-
nies, led by Enron, 22 on November 16, 1992, then-Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Chairwoman Wendy Gramm muscled
through a rule change-later known as Rule 35-that exempted cer-
tain energy trading contracts from the requirement that all futures
contracts be traded on a regulated exchange like NYMEX, thereby
allowing companies like Enron and Goldman Sachs to trade energy
contracts between themselves outside regulated exchanges. 23. Impor-
(2005) (statement of Dr. James Newsome, President, New York Mercantile Ex-
change, Inc), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/ Hear-
ings/09072005hearing 1 630/Newsome.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
16 MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERM SUBCOMM ON INVESTIGATIONS OF S. COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 10 5 TH CONG., REPORT ON U.S. STRATEGIC
PETROLEUM RESERVE: RECENT POLICY HAS INCREASED COSTS TO CONSUMERS BUT
NOT OVERALL U.S. ENERGY SECURITY, (Comm. Print 2003). available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/05jun20031230/www.access.gpo.gov/con
gress/senate/pdf/108hrg/85551 .pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2007)
17 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b,, 13(a)(2) (West 2007).
18 THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION supra note 9 at 4.
'9 THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION supra note 9 at 32
20 Id..
21 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, 7 U.S.C.A
§5, et. seq. (2000).
22 The other eight companies were: BP, Coastal Corp (now El Paso Corp.)
Conoco and Phillips (now ConocoPhillips), Goldman Sachs' J. Aron & Co, Koch
Industries, Mobil (now ExxonMobil) and Phibro Energy (now a subsidiary of Citi-
Group).
23 Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy & Environment. Program, Blind
Faith: How Deregulation and Enron's Influence Over Government Looted Billions
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tantly, the new rule also exempts energy "swaps"-a bilateral agree-
ment to "swap" a commodity for a certain price at a certain date-
from the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act.24 At
the same time, Gramm initiated a proposed order granting a similar
exemption to large commercial participants in various energy con-
tracts that was later approved in April 2003.25
Of the nine companies writing letters of support for the rule
change, Enron made by far the largest contributions to Wendy
Gramm's husband, then Texas Senator Phil Gramm's campaign fund
at that time, donating $34,100.26
Wendy Gramm's decision was controversial. Then-U.S. Rep.
Glen English, then-chairman of a House Agriculture subcommittee
with jurisdiction over the CFTC and current CEO of the National Ru-
ral Electric Cooperative Association, protested that Wendy Gramm's
action prevented the CFTC from intervening in basic energy futures
contracts disputes, even in cases of fraud, noting that "in my 18 years
in Congress this [Gramm's vote to deregulate] is the most irresponsi-
ble decision I have come across." 27 Sheila Bair, the CFTC commis-
sioner casting the lone dissenting vote, argued that deregulation of
energy futures contracts "sets a dangerous precedent." 28 A U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office report issued a year later urged Congress to
increase regulatory oversight over derivative contracts,2 9 and a con-
gressional inquiry found that CFTC staff analysts and economists be-
lieved Gramm's hasty move prevented adequate policy review.
30
from Americans (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/cmep/en-
ergyenvironuclear/electricity/Enron/articles.cfin?ID=7104 [hereinafter Blind
Faith]; Jim Drinkard & Greg Farell, Enron Made A Sound Investment in Washing-
ton, USA TODAY, Jan 24. 2002 at Al.
24 See 17 C.F.R. § 1 (2006), available at www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/wais-
idx_06/17cfr35_06.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
25 "Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products," 58 Fed. Reg.
6250 (1993).
26 Charles Lewis, The Buying of the President 1996, 153. (The Center for Pub-
lic Integrity) (1996).
27 Blind Faith supra note 22, at 12; Forward-Contract Fraud Exception May be
Reversed, Says Congressman. Inside F.E.R.C. Gas Market report, May 7, 1993 at
Derivatives Trading 4.
28 Forward-Contract Fraud Exception May be Reversed, Says Congressman.
Inside F.E.R.C. Gas Market report, May 7, 1993 at Derivatives Trading 4.
29 See generally, G.A 0 REPORT ON FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 8-9 (May 18, 1994), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151647.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2007)
30 Blind Faith, supra note 22; Brent Walth & Jim Barnett, "A Web of Influ-
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Five weeks after pushing through the "Enron loophole,"
Wendy Gramm was asked by Kenneth Lay to serve on Enron's Board
of Directors. 31 When asked to comment about Gramm's nearly im-
mediate retention by Enron, Lay called it "convoluted" to question
the propriety of naming her to the board.32
Congress followed Wendy Gramm's lead in deregulating en-
ergy trading contracts and moved to deregulate energy trading ex-
changes by exempting electronic exchanges, like those quickly set up
by Enron, from regulatory oversight. These unregulated exchanges
contrast with traditional trading floors like NYMEX that remained
regulated.33 Congress took this action during last-minute legislative
maneuvering on behalf of Enron by former Texas GOP Senator
Gramm in the lame-duck Congress two days after the Supreme Court
ruled in Bush v Gore,34 buried in 712 pages of unrelated legislation.35
As Public Citizen, the nation's largest consumer advocacy organiza-
tion, pointed out back in 2001, this law deregulated over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives energy trading by "exempting such trading from
the Commodity Exchange Act, removing anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation regulation over these derivatives markets and exempt-
ing "electronic" exchanges from CFTC regulatory oversight. 36
The OTC derivates energy trading deregulation law was
passed against the explicit recommendations of a multi-agency re-
view of derivatives markets.37 The November 1999 release of a report
by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets-(a multi-
agency policy group with permanent standing composed at the time
of Lawrence Summers, Secretary of the Treasury; Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve; Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Se-
ence," PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 8, 1996.
3' Frontline: So You Want to Buy a President, Wendy Gramm (last visited Apr.
8, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/president/players/gramm.html
32 32 Blind Faith, supra note 22 (quoting Jerry Knight, Energy Firm Finds Ally,
Director, in CFTC Ex-Chief, WASHINGTON POST,, (Apr. 17, 1993.)
33 See supra Section II.
34 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
35 See generally, Pub. L. No. 106-554, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 106_cong-publiclaws
&docid=f~pub554.106.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2007) (stating HR 5660, amend-
ing H.R.4577, now, Appendix E).
36 See Blind Faith, supra note 22.
37 See Report of the President's Working Group on Fin. Markets: Over-the-
Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, available at.
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/otcact.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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curities and Exchange Commission; and William Rainer, Chairman
of the CFTC)--concluded that energy trading must not be deregu-
lated. The Group reasoned that "due to the characteristics of markets
for nonfinancial commodities with finite supplies.., the Working
Group is unanimously recommending that the [regulatory] exclusion
not be extended to agreements involving such commodities." 38
As a result of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act,39
trading in unregulated OTC exchanges is growing. Trading volume
on the ICE has skyrocketed, with the 93 million contracts traded in
2006 representing a 120 percent increase from 2005, and the 12.6
million contracts traded in January 2007 a 166 percent increase from
a year earlier.
40
The founding members of ICE include Goldman Sachs, BP,
Shell and Totalfina Elf.41 In November 2005, ICE became a publicly
traded corporation. 42 Goldman Sachs remains a significant share-
holder of ICE, owning about 7.4 percent of the exchan e's shares,
while Morgan Stanley owns 7.3 percent and BP 5 percent. 3
Goldman Sachs' trading unit, J. Aron, is one of the largest and
most powerful energy traders in the United States, and commodities
trading reg4resents a significant source of revenue and profits for the
company. Goldman Sachs' most recent 10-K filed with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission shows that Fixed Income, Cur-
rency and Commodities, which includes energy trading, generated
nearly 40 percent of Goldman's $37.7 billion in revenue for 2006.45
In the summer of 2006, Goldman Sachs, which at the time
31 See Id.
39 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, 7 U.S.C.A
§5, et. seq. (2000).
40 InterContinental Exchange, Inc., located at www.theice.com/exchange_vol-
umes_ 2005. jhtml (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
41 See United States Securities and Exchange Commission Form S-1, available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1174746/000095012305003467/yO
540sv 1.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007)
42 See United States Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10-K avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 1174746/00009501440700160
3/g054 2 2 e l0vk.htm (last visited Apr.24, 2007).
43 Yahoo! Finance, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=ICE (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007).
44See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Form 10-K 6 (Feb. 5, 2007), available
at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/investor-relations/financialreports/
docs/2006_ Form_1 0-K.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
45 id.
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operated the largest commodity index, GSCI, announced it was radi-
cally changing the index's weighting of gasoline futures, selling
about $6 billion worth of gasoline.46 As a result of this weighting
change, Goldman Sachs helped cause gasoline futures prices to fall
nearly 10 percent.
47
A recent bipartisan U.S. Senate investigation summed up the
negative impacts on oil prices with this shift towards unregulated en-
ergy trading speculation:
[O]ver the last few years, large financial institutions, hedge
funds, pension funds, and other investment funds have been
pouring billions of dollars into the energy commodity mar-
kets-perhaps as much as $60 billion in the regulated U.S.
oil futures market alone.. .The large purchases of crude oil
futures contracts by speculators have, in effect, created an
additional demand for oil, driving up the price of oil to be
delivered in the future in the same manner that additional
demand for the immediate delivery of a physical barrel of
oil drives up the price on the spot market... Several ana-
lysts have estimated that speculative purchases of oil fu-
tures have added as much as $20-$25 per barrel to the cur-
rent price of crude oil... large speculative buying or selling
of futures contracts can distort the market signals regarding
supply and demand in the physical market or lead to exces-
sive price volatility, either of which can cause a cascade of
consequences detrimental to the overall economy... At the
same time that there has been a huge influx of speculative
dollars in energy commodities, the CFTC's ability to moni-
tor the nature, extent, and effect of this speculation has
been diminishing. Most significantly, there has been an ex-
plosion of trading of U.S. energy commodities on ex-
changes that are not regulated by the CFTC.. .in contrast to
trades conducted on the NYMEX, traders on unregulated
OTC electronic exchanges are not required to keep records
or file Large Trader Reports with the CFTC, and these
trades are exempt from routine CFTC oversights. In con-
trast to trades conducted on regulated futures exchanges,
there is no limit on the number of contracts a speculator
may hold on an unregulated OTC electronic exchange, no
monitoring of trading by the exchange itself, and no report-
46 Heather Timmons, Change in Goldman Index Was Factor in Gas Price
Drop, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at C1.
47 Id.
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ing of the amount of outstanding contracts ("open interest")
at the end of each day. 48
Thanks to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act49, par-
ticipants in these newly-deregulated energy trading markets are not
required to file so-called Large Trader Reports50 , the records of all
trades that NYMEX traders are required to report to the CFTC, along
with daily price and volume information.5 1 The Large Trader Re-
ports, together with the price and volume data, are the primary tools
of the CFTC's regulatory regime: "[t]he Commission's Large Trader
information system is one of the cornerstones of our surveillance
program and enables detection of concentrated and coordinated posi-
tions that might be used by one or more traders to attempt manipula-
tion.",52 So the deregulation of OTC markets, by allowing traders to
escape such basic information reporting, leave federal regulators with
no tools to routinely determine whether market manipulation is oc-
curring in energy trading markets.
Oil companies, investment banks and hedge funds are exploit-
ing the lack of government oversight to price-gouge consumers and
make billions of dollars in profits. These energy traders boast about
how they are price-gouging Americans, as a recent Dow Jones article
makes clear: energy "traders who profited enormously on the supply
crunch following Hurricane Katrina cashed out of the market ahead
of the long weekend. 'There are traders who made so much money
48 STAFF OF THE PERM, SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 1 0 9 TH CONG., REPORT ON
THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION IN RISING OIL AND GAS PRICES: A NEED To
PUT THE CoP BACK ON THE BEAT, [hereinafter, THE ROLE OF MARKET
SPECULATION] available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_congsenate committeeprints&docid-f:28640.pdf (last visited Apr.
23, 2007).
49 See 7 U.S.C. §5, et. seq (2000).
50 See Implementation of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (discuss-
ing large trader reporting requirements), available at
http://www.amoldporter.com/pubs/files/1 1_2001 f.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
51 The Role Of Market Speculation In Rising Oil And Gas Prices: A Need To
Put The Cop Back On The Beat, Staff Report prepared by the Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmen-
tal Affairs of the U.S. Senate, June 27, 2006, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 109 congsenatecorn
mitteeprints&docid=f:28640.pdf.
52 Letter from Reuben Jeffrey III, Chairman, CFTC, to Michigan Governor
Jennifer Granholm, (Aug. 22, 2005); THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION, supra
note 18.
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this week, they won't have to punch another ticket for the rest of this
year,' (said Addison Armstrong, manager of exchange-traded mar-
kets for TFS Energy Futures).
It is difficult for federal regulators to investigate market ma-
nipulation allegations even on the lightly-regulated exchanges like
NYMEX let alone the unregulated OTC market. For example, as of
August 2006, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is still investigating
allegations of 4gasoline futures manipulation that occurred on a single
day in 2002.' If it takes the DOJ four years to investigate a single
day's worth of market manipulation, energy traders intent on price-
gouging the public, clearly do not have much to fear.
That said, there have been some settlements for manipulation
by large oil companies.55 In January 2006, the CFTC issued a civil
penalty against Shell Oil for "non-competitive transactions" in U.S.
crude oil futures markets. 56 In March 2005, a Shell subsidiary agreed
to pay $4 million to settle allegations that it provided false informa-
tion during a federal investigation into market manipulation.57 Coral
energy is a subsidiary of Shell. 58 In August 2004, the same Shell Oil
subsidiary agreed to pay $7.8 million to settle allegations of energy
market manipulation.59 In July 2004, Shell agreed to pay $30 million
53 Leah McGrath Goodman, "Oil Futures, Gasoline In NY End Sharply
Lower," Dow Jones Sept. 2, 2005.
54 John R. Wilke, et. al., BP Woes Deepen with New Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug.
29, 2006 at Cl.
55 See also Tyson Slocum, Hot Profits and Global Warming How Oil Compa-
nies Hurt Consumers and the Environment 11 (Sept. 2006), available at available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/energymarkets/background/slocum-oilgas.pdf.
(last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
56 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, U.S. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Assesses Penalties of $300,000 Against Shell-Related
Companies and Trader in Settling Charges of Prearranging Crude Oil Trades, (Jan.
4, 2006) available at www.cftc.gov/opa/enf06/opa5150-06.htm (last visited Apr.
24, 2007).
57 Press Release, Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Commission Accepts Set-
tlement Resolving Investigation of Coral Energy Resources, (Mar. 3, 2005), avail-
able at www.ferc.gov/press-room/press-releases/2005/2005-1/03-03-05.asp (last
visited Apr. 24, 2007).
58 www.coral-energy.com
59 Order Approving Contested Settlement, 106 FERC 61,020 (2004) available
at www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/072804/E-60.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2007)
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60
to settle allegations it manipulated natural gas prices. In June 2006,
the CFTC brought civil charges against BP for allegedly manipulat-
ing the entire U.S. propane market. 6' In September 2003, BP agreed
to pay NYMEX $2.5 million to settle allegations that the company
had engaged in improper crude oil trading, and in July 2003, BP
agreed to pay $3 million to settle allegations that it manipulated en-
ergy markets.
62
Many industry analysts agree that speculation is forcing oil
and natural gas prices to increase.63 For example, a May 2006 Citi-
group report on the monthly average value of speculative positions in
American commodity markets, found that the value of speculative
positions in oil and natural gas stood at $60 billion, and that "the hike
in speculative positions has been a key driver for the latest surge in
commodity prices."
64
Natural gas markets are also harmed by these unregulated
trading markets. Public Citizen representatives testified before Con-
gress on this issue,65 and four state attorneys general concluded in a
March 2006 report that "natural gas commodity markets have exhib-
ited erratic behavior and a massive increase in trading that contributes
to both volatility and the upward trend in prices."
66
In a report later dismissed in a New York Times article, the
CFTC recently concluded that there was "no evidence of a link be-
tween price changes and MMT [managed money trader] positions" in
60 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Coral Energy Pays
$30 Million to Settle U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Charges of At-
tempted Manipulation and False Reporting, (Feb. 3, 2006), available at
www.cftc.gov/opa/enfO4/opa4964-04.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007)
61 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n U.S. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Charges BP Products North America, Inc. with Corner-
ing the Propane Market and Manipulating the Price of Propane, (Jun. 28, 2006),
available at www.cftc.gov/opa/enf06/opa5193-06.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2007)
62 Order Approving Stipulation and Consent Agreement, 104 FERC 61,089
(2003) available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID =
10414789 (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
63 See also Slocum, Hot Profits, supra note 53, at 10.
64 See THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION, supra note 18 at 20.
65 The Need for Stronger Regulation of U.S. Natural Gas Markets, supra note
1.
66 Mark N. Cooper, The Role of Supply, Demand and Financial Commodity
Markets in the Natural Gas Price Spiral, 3 (Prepared for, Midwest Attorneys Gen-
eral Natural Gas Working Group (Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, 2006) (Mar.
3, 2006), available at www.ago.mo.gov/pdf/NaturalGasReport.pdf (last visited Apr.
25, 2007).
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the natural gas markets and "a significantly negative relationship be-
tween MMT positions and prices changes... in the crude oil mar-
ket."
67
But, the CFTC study is flawed for numerous reasons, includ-
ing the fact that the role of hedge funds and other speculations on
long-term trading were not included in the analysis. The New York
Times reported that "many traders have scoffed at the studies, saysing
that they focused only on certain months, missing price run-ups.
Public Citizen has long supported regulation of these ex-
changes, but the latest legislative effort to repeal the Commodity Fu-
tures Modernization Act of 2000 was rejected by the Senate by a vote
of 55-44 in June 2003.69 The lobbying influence of oil companies,
financial firms and hedge funds played a key role in defeating the
amendment. As the growth of hedge funds in energy markets contin-
ues, so does the industry's presence on Capitol Hill. The Managed
Funds Association (MFA), which represents hedge funds, and its po-
litical action committee has doled out $300,900 in campaign contri-
butions to members of congress since 2003.70 (MFA-which re-
cently put former Democratic Sen. John Breaux now a Patton Boggs
lobbyist on its Board-operates out of the offices of the lobbying
firm Smith Bucklin.) MFA hired at least nine former Congressional
and Executive Branch officials, including: Patton Boggs' Don
Moorehead former GOP Chief Counsel to the Senate Finance Com-
mittee; the duo of Peter Rich former GOP House Energy Committee
staffer and husband of a former senior counsel to the House Commit-
tee on Financial Services and Mitchell Feuer former Democratic
staffer on the Senate Banking Committee; Sullivan & Cromwell's
Kenneth Raisler former general counsel of the CFTC; and Williams
& Jensen's cadre of lobbyists: David E. Franasiak, former Staff Di-
rector to the Tax Oversight Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Small Business Committee; J. Steven Hart, a former
Reagan Administration official; Joel G. Oswald, former Senate Bank-
67 Michael S. Haigh, et. al., Price Dynamics, Price Discovery and Large Fu-
tures Trader Interactions in the Energy Complex, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Apr. 28, 2005, 1 available at www.cftc.gov/files/opa/press05/opacftc-
managed-money-trader-study.pdf, (last visited Apr. 26, 2007)
68 Alexei Barrionuevo, Energy Trading, Without a Certain "E, " N.Y.TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2006, §3 at 1.
69 U.S. Senate Role Call Votes, 10 8th Congress, 1St Session, available at
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/rollcalllists/rollcallvotecftm.cfm?congress= I
08&session=l &vote=00 218 (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
70 See generally Federal Election Campaign, Campaign Finance Reports and
Data, www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/srssea.shtml
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ing Committee staffer working for Senator Michael B. Enzi (R-WY);
and Christopher W. Hatcher, Legislative Director and Counsel for
former Congressman Scott Mclnnis (R-CO). 71
The lightly-regulated exchanges, like NYMEX, have their
own revolving door army: NYMEX hires the lobbying services of
Arent Fox, where at least three former Congressional staffers influ-
ence their former bosses: Harry Katrichis, former chief counsel to the
US House of Representatives Committee on Small Business from
1995 to 2001; Lance Kotschwar, former General Counsel for the
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; and Vicki
J. Hicks, former senior Democratic Senate staffer and a senior USDA
political appointee. 72 Since 2003, NYMEX's Political Action Com-
mittee has made $1.5 million in campaign contributions.73
BP has been paying the Duberstein Group $100,000 every six
months to lobby Congress on "CFTC trading issues," with at least
four lobbyists on the BP account: (Kenneth Duberstein, former chief
of staff to President Reagan; Michael Berman, well connected with
Democrats; Steven Champlin, staffer for former Rep. David Bonior;
Henry Gandy, former legislative aide to President Bush; and Daniel
Meyer, who serves on the board of the GOP-affiliated Congressional
Institute.) 74
The CFTC has a troublesome streak of "revolving door" ap-
pointments and hiring which may further hamper the ability of the
agency to effectively regulate the energy trading industry. In August
2004, CFTC chairman James Newsome left the commission to accept
a $1 million yearly salary as president of NYMEX, the world's larg-
est energy futures marketplace.75 Just weeks later, Scott Parsons, the
CFTC's chief operating officer, resigned to become executive vice-
president for government affairs at the Managed Funds Association.
76
71 See Slocum, HOT PROFITS, supra note 53, at 9.
72 Arent Fox, LLP Governmental Relations Team, http://www.arentfox.com/
practices/govrelations/index.cfm?fa=team (follow the respective hyperlinks to each
individual) (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
73 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74 Secretary of Senate, Office of Public Records, The Duberstein, Group Inc.,
available at http://sopr.senate.gov/cgi-win/opr gifviewer.exe?/2006/EH/000/1 13/
00011338315 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
75 Leah McGrath Goodman, CFTC's Newsome to Become Nymex President
Aug 2, Dow Jones Newswires, July 9, 2004.
76 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Announces Depar-
ture of Scott Parsons (Aug. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.nymex.com/media/8k_070904.pdf. (last visited Apr. 26, 2007); see also
Slocum, HOT PROFITS supra note 53, at 12.
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Former CFTC Lead Prosecutor Anthony Mansfield, former Chief
Trial Attorney and Counsel to the Director of the Division of En-
forcement at the CFTC, left the Commission to join the DC firm
Heller Ehrman, where he will work for Geoff Aronow-his old boss
at CFTC.77
Such prominent defects may hamper the CFTC's ability to
protect consumers because former regulators now serve with indus-
tries being regulated. As a result, a revolving door moratorium should
be established to limit CFTC decision makers from leaving the
agency to go to entities under its regulatory jurisdiction for a set pe-
riod of time. 7
8
II. Latest Trading Trick: Energy Infrastructure
Affiliate Abuses
Energy traders like Goldman Sachs are investing and acquir-
ing energy infrastructure assets because controlling pipelines and
storage facilities affords their energy trading affiliates an "insider's
peek" into the physical movements of energy products unavailable to
other energy traders. Armed with this non-public data, a company
like Goldman Sachs could open lines of communication between the
affiliates operating pipelines and the affiliates making large bets on
energy futures markets. Without strong firewalls prohibiting such
communications, consumers would be susceptible to price-gouging
by energy trading affiliates.
For example, in January 2007, Highbridge Capital Manage-
ment, a hedge fund controlled by JP Morgan Chase, bought a stake in
an energy unit of Louis Dreyfus Group to expand its oil and natural
gas trading.79 Glenn Dubin, co-founder of Highbridge, said that own-
ing physical energy assets like pipelines and storage facilities was
crucial to investing in the business: "[t]hat gives you a very important
information advantage. You're not just screen-trading financial prod-
ucts."
80
Indeed, such an "information advantage" played a key role in
77 Press Release, Heller Ehrman, Anthony Mansfield Joins Heller Ehrman as
Special Counsel in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 10, 2007).
78 See also Slocum, HOT PROFITS supra note 53, at 12
79 Saijel Kishan & Jenny Strasburg, Highbridge Capital Buys Stake in Louis
Dreyfus Unit, Bloomberg, Jan. 8, 2007, available at Bloomberg.com
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601014&sid=aBnQylbotdFo (last visited
Apr. 26, 2007).
80 id.
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allowing BP's energy traders to manipulate the entire U.S. propane
market. 1 In June 2006, the CFTC filed a civil complaint against BP,
alleging that the company's energy trading affiliate used the com-
pany's huge control over transportation and storage to allow the en-
ergy trading affiliate to exploit information about energy moving
through BP's infrastructure to manipulate the market.
82
BP's energy trading division, North America Gas & Power
(NAGP), was actively communicating with the company's Natural
Gas Liquids Business Unit (NGLBU), which handled the physical83
production, pipeline transportation and retail sales of propane. Part
of the civil complaint against BP details how the two divisions coor-
dinated their manipulation strategy, which includes "assurance that
[the] trading team has access to all information and optionality within
[all of BP]...that can be used to increase chance of success [of mar-
ket manipulation]... Implement weekly meetings with Marketing &
Logistics to review trading positions and share opportunities. '" 84
This shows that energy traders were actively engaging the
physical infrastructure affiliates in an effort to glean information
helpful for market manipulation strategies. It is also important to
note that BP's market manipulation strategy was extremely aggres-
sive and blatant, and regulators were given a tip by an internal whis-
85tleblower. A more subtle manipulation effort could easily evade
detection by federal regulators, making it all the more important to
establish firewalls between energy assets affiliates and energy trading
affiliates to prevent any undue communication between the units.
The Wall Street Journal reported that the government investi-
gation goes beyond manipulation of propane: "investigators are ex-
amining, among other things, whether BP used information about its
81 John Wilke & Chip Cummins, U.S. Accuses BP of Manipulating Price of
Propane, WALL ST. J., Jun. 29, 2006 at Al.
82 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Charges BP Products North America with Cornering
the Propane Market and Manipulating Pricing of Propane (June. 28, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/adv06/opawa26-06.htm. (The lawsuit was filed in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which sits in
Chicago.); Id.
83 See www.cftc.gov/files/enf/06orders/opa-bp-lessons-learned.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 26, 2007).
84 Id.
85 Tony Hopfinger, One Crude Dude: With Big Oil reeling from the Prudhoe
Bay shutdown, Chuck Hamel can finally say, 'I told you so, SEATTLE WEEKLY
(Aug. 23, 2006), available at http://www.seattleweekly.com/2006-08-23/news/one-
crude-dude.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
[Vol. 19:4
Standard Oil Rises Again
own pipelines and storage tanks at a key oil-delivery point in Cush-
ing, Okla., to influence crude-oil price benchmarks that are set each
day and influence billions of dollars of transactions."86 CFTC staff
have also recommended an enforcement action against Marathon Oil
for crude-oil price manipulation.87
Financial firms like hedge funds and investment banks that
normally would not bother purchasing low-profit investments like oil
and gasoline storage have been snapping up ownership or leasing
rights or both to these facilities because of the wealth of information
that controlling energy infrastructure assets provides to help one's
energy traders manipulate trading markets.88 For example, according
to The Trader Monthly, just one Morgan Stanley trader was able to
earn as much as $25 million and "helped the bank dominate the heat-
ing oil market by locking up New Jersey storage-tank farms adjacent
to New York Harbor." 89 The publication also revealed that legendary
trader T. Boone Pickens earned as much as $1.5 billion in 2005, for a
rate of return exceeding 700 percent, which it is believed "is the larg-
est one-year sum ever earned."90 In August 2006, Goldman Sachs,
AIG and Carlyle/Riverstone announced the $22 billion acquisition of
Kinder Morgan, Inc., which controls 43,000 miles of crude oil, re-
fined products and natural gas pipelines, in addition to 150 storage
terminals.
9 1
Prior to this huge purchase, Goldman Sachs had already as-
sembled a long list of oil and gas investments. In 2005, Goldman
Sachs and private equity firm Kelso & Co. bought the Coffeyville oil
refinery in Kansas. In May 2004, Goldman Sachs spent $413 mil-
86 John R. Wilke, et. al. , BP Woes Deepen with New Probe, WALL ST. J. Aug.
29, 2006 at C1.
87 Ann Davis, "U.S. Probes Crude-Price Manipulation," The Wall Street Jour-
nal, May 10, 2007, Page C2.
88 See e.g. Kathryn Kranhold, GE and Canadian Fund to Buy Pipelines as En-
ergy Interest Rises, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2005, at B2.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Press Release, The Carlyle Group, Kinder Morgan, Inc. Enters into Agree-
ment to Sell to Investor Group for $107.50 Per Share (Aug. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/eng/news/15-news3544.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2007); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jad Mouawad, Gas Giant Gets Offer for Buyout,
N.Y. Times, May 30, 2006, at C1.
92 Press Release, Coffeyville Resources, Coffeyville Resources Acquired, Jack
Lipinski Named CEO (July 12, 2006), available at http://12.158.136.92/Pdfs/
pressRoom0l .pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
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lion to acquire royalty rights to more than 1,600 natural gas wells in
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Texas, Oklahoma and offshore Louisi-
ana from Dominion Resources. 93 Goldman Sachs also owns a six
percent stake in the 375-mile Iroquois natural gas pipeline, which
runs from Northern New York through Connecticut to Long Island.94
In December 2005, Goldman and Carlyle/Riverstone together in-
vested $500 million in Cobalt International Energy, a new oil explo-
ration firm run by former Unocal executives.
95
In July 2005, GE and Caisse de ddp6t et placement du Qu6-
bec, who manages public and private pension and insurance funds,
purchased Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline (Southern Star) from
AIG for $326 million plus the assumption of $476 million in debt and
preferred stock.9 6 Southern Star runs for 6,000 miles through Texas
Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming.
91
GE owns 60% and Caisse owns 40%.98
Carlyle/Riverstone is a private equity fund. In April 2003,
Carlyle/Riverstone teamed up with Madison Dearborn Partners to
purchase a controlling stake in Williams Energy Partners, since re-
named Magellan Midstream Partners, for $1.08 billion.99 Magellan
Midstream went on to pay $492.4 million for another refined product
pipeline system from Shell Oil.' 00 The Magellan refined products
pipeline system begins in Texas and runs to Oklahoma, Colorado,
93 Press Release, Dominion, Dominion Announces Volumetric Production
Payment Transaction with Goldman Sachs (May 6, 2004), available at
http://www.dom.com/news/ep2004/pr0506.jsp (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
94 Iroquois, Pipeline Services System Map, http://www.iroquois.com/new-
Internet/igts/PipelineSvs/pssysmp.asp (last visited May 21, 2007).
95 Press Release, The Carlyle Group, Carlyle/Riverstone and Goldman Sachs to
invest $500 million in Cobalt International Energy, a New Oil & Gas Exploration
and Production Company (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.thecarlylegroup.
com/eng/newsi15-news3258.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
96 Press Release, Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, GE Commercial Finance
and Caisse de Ddp6t et placement du Qudbec Agree to Buy Major Midwestern Gas
Pipeline from AIG Highstar Capital (July 11, 2005), available at
www.sscgp.com/News/archive/2005/sold.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
97 Southern Star Gas Central Pipeline, Inc. - About Us,
http://www.sscgp.com/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
98Kranhold, supra note 84.
99 Press Release, Williams Engergy Partners Announces Buyer of General
Partnership Interest (Apr. 21, 2003), available at http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/
eng/news/15-news2588.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007)
'oo Magellan Mainstream Buys 2,000 Miles of Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES Jun. 25,
2004, at C3.
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Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota,
and North and South Dakota.' 6' In response to the Car-
lyle/Riverstone acquisition of Kinder Morgan, all the Federal Trade
Commission required was that Carlyle/Riverstone's investment in
Magellan be changed to passive. 102 In May 2004, Carlyle/Riverstone
became the general partner of Buckeye Partners, which owns an inte-
grated pipeline system running through Missouri, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut
and Massachusetts.'0 3 Carlyle/ Riverstone is the general partner of
SemGroup, which owns pipelines and storage facilities throughout
the United State. 10 4 Carlyle/Riverstone owns Legend Natural Gas
and Phoenix Exploration, both of which are domestic oil and gas pro-
ducers. 1 05
In 2003, Morgan Stanley teamed up with Apache Corp to buy
26 oil and gas fields from Shell for $500 million, of which Morgan
Stanley put up $300 million in exchange for a portion of the produc-
tion over the next four years, which it used to supplement its energy
trading desk. 10
6
Solutions
0 Re-regulate energy trading markets by subjecting
OTC electronic exchanges to full compliance under
the Commodity Exchange Act and mandate that all
'01 Magellan Mainstream Partners, LP, Assets,, http://www.magellanlp.com/
assets.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2007)
102 FTC Challenges Acquisition of Interests in Kinder Morgan, Inc. by The
Carlyle Group and Riverstone Holdings, available at
www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/01/kindermorgan.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
103 Press Release, General Partner of Buckeye Partners, L.P., sold to Car-
lyle/Riverstone Global Energy and Power Fund II, L.P. (May 4, 2004), available at
http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/eng/news/15-news2783.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2007); Press Release, Buckeye Partners, LP Acquires Midwest Pipelines and Ter-
minals from Shell (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/
eng/news/15-news2884.html. Recently, the refinery was sold yet again.
http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/eng/news/15-news3774.html (last visited Apr. 23,
2007).
'04 The Carlylegroup, SemGroup L.P., http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/eng/
portfolio/portfoliol5-3012.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
105 The Carlylegroup, Legend Natural Gas, http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/
eng/industry/casestudy-770.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
106 Paul Merolli, Two Morgan Stanley M&A deals show bullish stance on gas,
Natural Gas Week, Volume 19; Issue 28, July 14, 2003.
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OTC energy trades be subject to the CFTC's Large
Trader reporting requirements. In addition, regula-
tions must be strengthened over existing lightly-
regulated exchanges like NYMEX. Senators Fein-
stein, Snowe, Levin and Cantwell have introduced
S.577 in the 1 1 0 th Congress which would address
many of these issues. 17
" Impose legally-binding firewalls to limit energy
traders from speculating on information gleaned
from the company's energy infrastructure affiliates
or other such insider information, while at the same
time allowing legitimate hedging operations.'
0 8
* Congress must authorize the FTC and DOJ to place
greater emphasis on evaluating anti-competitive
practices that arise out of the nexus between control
over hard assets like energy infrastructure and a
firm's energy trading operations. As outlined above,
the increased presence of energy traders in owning
physical assets has allowed energy and financial
firms greater ability to have an "insiders peek" in
movements of energy commodities, giving them a
leg up in the futures markets. Incorporating energy
trading operations into anti-trust analysis must be-
come standard practice for federal regulatory and
enforcement agencies to force more divestiture of
assets in order to protect consumers from abuses.
10 9
* A revolving door moratorium must be established to
limit CFTC decision makers from leaving the
agency to go to entities under its regulatory jurisdic-
107 See THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION, supra note 18; Slocum, supra
note 53, at 12.
108 See Kishan & Strasburgm supra note 75; Wilke & Cummins, supra note 77;
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commissionn Charges BP Products North Amer-
ica With Cornering the Propane Market and Manipulating the Pricing of Propane,
supra note 78; Hot Profits, supra note 80; Hopfinger, supra note 81; Wilke, et. al.,
supra note 82; Kranhold, supra note 83;Slocum, Hot Profits, supra note 53, at 12.
109 See Slocum, supra note 53, at 12.
[Vol. 19:4430
Standard Oil Rises Again
tion for at least two years.I10
III. Recent Mergers, Weak Anti-Trust Laws Threaten
Consumers
In just the last few years, mergers between giant oil compa-
nies-such as Exxon and Mobil, Chevron and Texaco, Conoco and
Phillips-have resulted in just a few companies controlling a signifi-
cant amount of America's gasoline, squelching competition. ' In
1993, the largest five oil refiners, Chevron, Exxon, Amoco, Texaco
and Mobil, Controlled one-third of the American market, while the
largest 10 had 55.6 percent.' 2 By 2005, as a result of all the mergers,
the largest five now (ConocoPhillips, Valero, ExxonMobil, Shell and
BP) control 55 percent of the market, and the largest 10 dominate
81.4 percent.
113
In addition, legal decisions which favor a rule of reason
analysis rather than a per se analysis of alleged anticompetitive con-
duct, continue to erode anti-trust laws thereby exposing consumers to
uncompetitive markets. "
4
Although the United States is the third largest (Saudi Arabia
and Russia are the largest two) oil producing nation in the world-
producing more oil than Iran, Kuwait and Qatar combined' 5-the
United States consumes one out of every four barrels used in the
world every day, forcing the United States to import 60 percent of its
"0 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h), supra note 49; Letter From Reuben Jeffrey III,
Chairman, CFTC, to Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm, supra note 50; Role
of Market Speculation, supra note 50; Goodman, supra note 51 ;Wilke, et. al. , su-
pra note 52 Slocum, supra note 53; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, supra
note 54; Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, supra note 55; Fed. Energy Reg. Comm., su-
pra note 56; Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, supra note 57; CFTC An-
nounces Departure of Scott Parsons, supra note 72; Anthony Mansfield Joins
Heller Ehrman As Special Counsel in Washington, D.C., supra note 73; Slocum,
supra note 53, at 12; Kishan & Strasburg, supra note 75..
"l See New Jersey's High Gasoline Prices, supra note 1.
112 Data compiled by Public Citizen from Energy Information Administration
data.
13 Public Citizen calculations from Energy Information Administration data.
114 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997); Lucas v. Citizens
Comm. Co., 409 F.Supp.2d 1206, 1219 (D. Haw. 2005); United States v. Visa
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2nd Cir. 2003); Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc, 179 F.3d
847 (10th Cir. 1999).
115 Top World Oil Exporters and Producers, available at,
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables l_2.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007)
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oil and gasoline." 6 In all, the U.S. uses more oil than the next five
biggest oil consumers, China, Japan, Russia, Germany and India, to-
gether. 11
7
Sixty percent of the oil consumed in America is used as fuel
for cars and trucks. 118 Nine percent is for residential home heating,
and the remainder is largely used for various industrial and agricul-
tural processes. 19 Only 1.4 percent of the oil consumed is for fueling
electric power). 120
Persian Gulf OPEC nations supply 11.2 percent of America's
oil and gasoline. 121 Other OPEC nations-such as Indonesia, Nigeria
and Venezuela-supply 15.6 percent, and non-OPEC nations such as
Canada, Mexico, Norway and England provide the U.S. with 39.1
percent of its oil and gasoline needs.' 22 34.1 percent of America's oil
is drilled within the country.'
23
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office,
over 2,600 mergers in the United States petroleum industry have been
approved since the 1990s. 124 Over the last few years, mergers be-
tween giant oil companies-such as Exxon and Mobil, Chevron and
Texaco, Conoco and Phillips- resulted in only a few companies
controlling a significant amount of America's gasoline, squelching
competition. 125 In August 2005, ChevronTexaco acquired Unocal;' W
116 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Energy Markets: Effects of Mergers and
Market Concentration in the United States Petroleum Industry, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0496.pdf [hereinafter GAO Effects of Mergers]
(last visited Apr. 27, 2007)
117 Top World Oil Exporters and Producers, available at
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables3_4.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007)
118 Adjusted Sales of Distillate Fuel Oil by End Use in the U.S., 2005, avail-
able at, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-Cons82ldsta-dcu-nus a.htm (last
visited Apr. 23, 2007)
119Id.
120 id.
121 U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products Imports, available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-move-impcus-a2_nus-ep00_im mbblpd a.
htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
122 id.
123 Id.
124 GAO Effects of Mergers, supra note 108, at 4, 7
125 Id. at 7-8.
126 Press Release, ChevronTexaco Celebrates 2004 as a Year of Great Accom-
plishment (Apr. 27, 2005), available at http://www.chevron.com/news/press/
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ConocoPhillips acquired Burlington Resources in December 2005;127
and in June 2006, Anadarko Petroleum announced it was simultane-
ously acquiring Kerr-McGee and Western Gas Resources. 128
Consumers are paying more at the pump than they would if
they had access to competitive markets, and the five oil giants are
reaping the largest profits in history. Since 2001, the five largest oil
companies operating in America recorded $435 billion in profits.
While America's tremendous appetite for gasoline undoubtedly plays
a role, uncompetitive practices by oil corporations are (a) cause-
more so than OPEC or environmental laws--of high gasoline prices
around the country.' 
29
High oil prices detrimentally impact the economy and na-
tional security. Imported oil represents one-third of America's trade
deficit, 130 slows economic growth, adds to inflationary pressures and
creates financial hardship for families and businesses. America's ad-
diction to oil enriches not only oil companies, but non-democratic na-
tions that are often hostile to U.S. interests.' 31 In its' frenzied pursuit
to secure sources of oil abroad, the United States often prioritize oil
company rights over human rights, as demonstrated in the deferential
treatment the Bush Administration shows towards Kazakhstan de-
spite that country's poor human rights record.
132
The consolidation of downstream assets-particularly refiner-
ies-plays a big role in determining the price of a gallon of gas.1
3 3
Recent mergers have resulted in dangerously concentrated levels of
ownership over U.S. oil refining. 34 A recent government study re-
2005/2005-04-27.asp (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
127 Press Release, ConocoPhilips to Acquire Burlington Resources in $35.6
Billion Transaction (Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.conocophillips.com/
NR/rdonlyres/86E7B7A6-B953-4DOD-9B45-E4F 1016DD8FD/0/
copburlingtonpressrelease.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2007)
128 World Business Briefing Americas: Canada: Anadarko Sells Energy Assets,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at C4.
129 GAO EFFECTS OF MERGERS, supra note 108 at 6
130 See generally Bureau of Economic Affairs, Monthly Estimates of Trade in
Goods and Services, available at www.bea.gov/bea/di/home/trade.htm (last visited
May 22, 2007).
131 See, e.g., Information available at http://hrw.org/doc?t-europe&c=kazakh
(linking to articles reporting human rights violations in Kazakhstan) (last visited
Apr. 23, 2007).
132 id.
133 GAO Effects of Mergers, supra note 108 at 7
134 Id. (discussing increased concentration in industry).
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vealed that the "source of potential market power in the wholesale
gasoline market is at the refining level because the refinery market is
imperfectly competitive and refiners essentially control gasoline sales
at the wholesale level."
' 135
In 1993, the five largest U.S. oil refining companies con-
trolled 34.5 percent of domestic oil refinery capacity; the top ten
companies controlled 55.6 percent.' 36  By 2005, the top five-
ConocoPhillips, Valero, ExxonMobil, Shell and BP--controlled 55
percent and the top ten refiners controlled 81.4 percent.' 37 As a result
of all of these recent mergers, the largest five oil refiners today con-
trol as much capacity as the largest ten did a decade ago.
The industry has plenty of incentives to intentionally keep re-
fining markets tight. For example, ExxonMobil's new CEO told The
Wall Street Journal that even though American fuel consumption will
continue growing for the next decade, his company has no plans to
build new refineries:
Exxon Mobil Corp. says it believes that, by 2030, hybrid
gasoline-and-electric cars and light trucks will account for nearly
30% of new-vehicle sales in the U.S. and Canada. That surge is part
of a broader shift toward fuel efficiency that Exxon thinks will cause
fuel consumption by North American cars and light trucks to peak
around 2020-and then start to fall. "For that reason, we wouldn't
build a grassroots refinery" in the U.S., Rex Tillerson, Exxon's
chairman and chief executive, said in a recent interview. Exxon has
continued to expand the capacity of its existing refineries. But build-
ing a new refinery from scratch, Exxon believes, would be bad for
long-term business.' 
38
Margins for U.S. oil refiners have been at record highs. In
1999, U.S. oil refiners enjoyed an 18.9 cent margin for every gallon
refined from crude oil.' 39 By 2005, they posted a 48.8 cent margin
135 Energy Markets: Mergers and Other Factors that Affect the U.S. Refining
Industry: Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality, Comm. on Energy and
Com. (2004) (statement of Jim Wells, Director, Natural Resources and environ-
ment) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04982t.pdf(last visited Apr. 22,
2007),
136 Public Citizen calculations of Energy Information Administration data.
137 Id.
138 Jeffrey Ball, As Gasoline Prices Soar, Americans Resist Major Cuts in Con-
sumption, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2006 at Al.
139 2005 EIA ANN. ENERGY REv. 175 available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec5_53.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
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for every gallon of gasoline refined, a 158 percent jump.' 40 That
forced The Wall Street Journal to conclude that "the U.S. market is
especially lucrative, sometimes earning its refiners $20 or more on
every barrel of crude oil 
they refine."'
4 r
Indeed, BP's most recent financial report shows that refining
profit margins in the United States operations are more than double
the margins in other countries. 142 In 2006, BP earned $9.14 for every
barrel they refined in the Midwest, $12 per barrel in the Gulf Coast
and $14.84 per barrel on the West Coast. 143 In comparison, the re-
turns from BP's English operations were $3.92 per barrel and in Sin-
gapore, operations were $4.22 per barrel.'*
Concentration of refinery markets has been compounded by
consolidation in gasoline marketing. Refiners get gasoline to the
market by distributing their product through terminals, where whole-
sale distributors, or jobbers, then deliver to retail gas stations. 145 The
number of terminals available to jobbers in the United States was cut
by half from 1982 to 1997, leaving retailers with fewer options if one
terminal raises prices. 1
46
As a result of this strategy of keeping refining capacity tight,
energy traders in New York are pushing the price of gasoline higher,
and then trading the price of crude oil up to follow gasoline:
"Last time, Mother Nature intervened in the market [in the
form of Hurricane Katrina]," [Larry] Goldstein [president of New
York-based Petroleum Industry Research Foundation] said. "This
time, prices are being driven by market forces," with gasoline pulling
crude and other forms offuel higher, he says.14 7
140 Id.
141 Steve LeVine & Patrick Barta, Giant New Oil Refinery in India Shows
Forces Roiling Industry, WALL ST. J. Aug. 29, 2006, at Al
14' BP, Group Results Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2006 Unaudited, at 8 (Feb.
6, 2007), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bpinternet/globalbp/
STAGING/global assets/downloads/B/bp fourthquarter-andfull_year2006res
ults.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 FED TRADE COMMISSION BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY: MERGERS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, AN
FTC STAFF STUDY 39 (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/08/040813mergersinpetrolberpt.pdf (last visited Apr.
22, 2007).
146 Id. at Table 9-1.
147 Bhushan Bahree Oil Prices Show No Sign of Slowing, WALL ST. J., Apr 10,
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Since gasoline futures are a more localized market than crude
oil, it is easier for oil companies, hedge funds and investment banks
to manipulate gasoline markets. Now that crude oil trading often fol-
lows the gasoline markets, the ability of these traders to exploit
America's underregulated futures markets raises concerns that con-
sumers are being price-gouged. 14
High domestic inventories are not suppressing prices. 14 In
April 2006, U.S. commercial inventories of crude oil surpassed 347
million barrels-the highest level since May 1998.149 Despite this
record domestic surplus, energy traders continue to push the price of
crude oil up.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission found evidence of anti-
competitive practices in its March 2001 Midwest Gasoline Price In-
vestigation:
"An executive of [one] company made clear that he would
rather sell less gasoline and earn a higher margin on each gallon sold
than sell more gasoline and earn a lower margin. Another employee
of this firm raised concerns about oversupplying the market and
thereby reducing the high market prices. A decision to limit supply
does not violate the antitrust laws, absent some agreement among
firms. Firms that withheld or delayed shipping additional supply in
the face of a price spike did not violate the antitrust laws. In each in-
stance, the firms chose strategies they thought would maximize their
profits."1
50
Although federal investigators found ample evidence of oil
companies intentionally withholding supplies from the market in the
summer of 2000, the government has not taken any action to prevent
recurrence. S.2557, introduced by Senator Arlen Specter (R-
Penn.),' 15 and its House companion HR 5279 introduced by Repre-
sentative John Conyers, 152 would amend the Clayton Act to make it
unlawful for oil companies to engage in unilateral withholding.'
53
2006 at A8 (emphasis in original).
148 Table Energy Info. Admin. U.S. Crude Oil Ending Stocks Excluding SPR
(Thousands of Barrels), Mar.1, 2007, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/
pet/hist/mcestus lm.htm (Apr. 22, 2007).
149 Id.
150 FINAL REP. OF THE FED. TRADE COMMISSION, MIDWEST GASOLINE PRICE
INVESTIGATION, Mar. 29, 2001 available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/03/
mwgasrpt.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2007)
151 Oil and Gas Antitrust Act of 2006, S. 2557, 109 th Cong. (2006).
152 H.R. 5279, 109th Cong. §2 (2006).
153 See S. 2557, 109th Cong. (2006) and H.R. 5279, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
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But neither of these bills received a hearing in the 10 9th Congress. 154
A congressional investigation in the late 1990s uncovered in-
ternal memos written by major oil companies operating in the U.S.
which discussed their successful strategies to maximize profits by
forcing independent refineries out of business, resulting in tighter re-
finery capacity. From 1995-2005, 97 percent of the nearly 929,000
barrels of oil per day of capacity that has been shut down were owned
by smaller, independent refiners.'
55
IV. The FTC is Not Adequately Protecting Consumers
The Federal Trade Commission has contributed to the prob-
lem by allowing too many mergers and taking a stance too permissive
to anti-competitive practices. This is evidenced by the conclusions in
its most recent investigation for example, the FTC found evidence of
price-gouging by oil companies but explained it away as profit
maximization strategies and opposing federal price-gouging stat-
utes. 156 This stands in stark contrast to the May 2004 conclusions
reached by a U.S. Government Accountability Office report' 57 which
found that recent mergers in the oil industry have directly led to
higher prices. It is important to note that this GAO report severely
underestimates the impact mergers have on prices because their price
analysis stopped in 2000-before the mergers that created Chevron-
Texaco-Unocal, ConocoPhillips-Burlington Resources, and Valero-
Ultramar/Diamond Shamrock-Premcor. r58
The FTC consistently allows refining capacity to be con-
154 See Status S. 2557, 109th Cong. (2006) http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN02557:@@@X (indicating last action on S. 2557 was
placement on the legislative calendar) (last visited Apr. 22, 2007); and Status H.R.
5279, 109th Cong. (2006) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
?d109:HR05279:@@@X (indicating that last major action on HR 5279 was a re-
ferral to committee in May 2006) (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
155 Energy Information Administration Form EIA-820, Annual Refinery Re-
port.
156 See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICE
MANIPULATION AND POST-KATRINA GASOLINE PRICE INCREASES,(Spring 2006),
available at
www.ftc.gov/reports/060518PublicGasolinePriceslnvestigationReportFinal.pdf
(last visited Apr. 22, 2007)
157 See GAO EFFECTS OF MERGERS, supra note 89 at 108.
158 See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text; See also Press Release,
Valero Energy Corp. Valero to Acquire Premcor in $8 Billion Transaction (Apr.
25, 2005), available at http://www.valero.com/NewsRoom/News+Releases/
NR_20050425.htm. (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
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trolled by fewer hands, allowing companies to keep most of their re-
fining assets when they merge, as a recent overview of FTC-
approved mergers demonstrates.
The FTC conditioned approval of the August 2002 Conoco-
Phillips merger on the company selling two of its refineries-
representing less than four percent of its capacity.'5 9 Thus Phillips
sold a Utah refinery, and Conoco sold a Colorado refinery.160 Even
with this forced sale, ConocoPhillips remains the third largest domes-
tic refiner, controlling refineries with a capacity of more than 2.2 mil-
lion barrels of oil per day, or 13 percent of America's entire capac-
ity.161 Curiously, after forcing the sale of two refineries, the FTC
allowed ConocoPhillips to purchase Premcor's 300,000 barrels/day
Illinois refinery in 2003162
As a condition of the 1999 merger creating ExxonMobil,
Exxon had to sell some of its gas retail stations in the Northeastern
United States as well as an oil refinery in California. 163 Valero En-
ergy, the nation's fifth largest owner of oil refineries, purchased the
assets Exxon sold. 164 The inadequacy of the forced divestiture man-
dated by the FTC was compounded by the fact that the assets were
simply transferred to another large oil company, ensuring that the
consolidation of the largest companies remained high.
The sale of the Golden Eagle refinery was ordered by the FTC
as a condition of Valero's purchase of Ultramar Diamond Shamrock
in 2001.165 Just as with ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco, Valero
sold the refinery along with 70 retail gas stations to another large
159 Public Citizen calculations of Energy Information Administration data.
160 id.
161 Public Citizen calculations of Energy Information Administration data.
162
www.conocophillips.com/newsroom/news-releases/2003releases/073103_woodriv
er.htm
163 Press Release, Fed. Trade Commission, Exxon Mobile Agrees to Largest
FTC Divesture Ever in Order to Settle FTC Antitrust Charges; Settlement requires
Extensive Restructuring and Prevents Merger of Significant Competing U.S. Assets
(Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/11/exxonmobil.htm
(last visited Apr. 22, 2007); See also GAO EFFECTS OF MERGERS supra note 89, at
64 n.21.
64 Alan Doyle, Valerno turns Benica over to an Old Hand, (Sept. 22, 2002),
www.bizjoumals.com/eastbay/stories/2002/09/30/story3.html.
165 Press Release, Fed. Trade Commission, Resolving Anticompetitive Con-
cerns, FTC Consent Order would Allow Merger of Valero Energy and Ultramar
(Dec. 18, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/12/valero.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 22, 2007).
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company, Tesoro. 166 But while the FTC forced Valero to sell one of
its four California refineries, the agency allowed the company to pur-
chase Orion Refining's only refinery in July 2003,167 and then ap-
proved Valero's purchase of the U.S. oil refinery company Prem-
cor. 168  The acquisition of Orion's Louisiana refinery and the
Premcor refinery defeats the original intent of the FTC's order for
Valero to divest one of its California refineries.
V. Rule of Reason versus Per Se Antitrust Analysis
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
continued an unfortunate trend of relying on the rule of reason rather
than a per se analysis of alleged anticompetitive conduct.1 69 Per se
offenses are those that are illegal on their face, with no economic jus-
tification. 170 All per se offences are violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. As the Supreme Court has found:
.. there are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming vir-
tue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore ille-
gal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use.
17 1
Examples of per se antitrust violations include: horizontal and
vertical price fixing, bid rigging, territorial allocation and tying ar-
rangements.
A rule of reason standard, on the other hand, is one where the
activity is judged in context and the reasonableness is considered. 172
Therefore, an action that otherwise would be unlawful could be
166 Press Release, Valero Energy Corporation, Valero Completes Sale of
Golden Eagle Refinery and Related Assets (May 17, 2002), available at
http://www.valero.com/NewsRoom/News+Releases/NR_2002-05-17.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2007)
167 Press Release, Valero Energy Corporation, Acquisition of Orion Refinery to
Proceed (Jun. 27, 2003), available at http://www.valero.com/NewsRoom/
News+Releases/NR_2003-06-27.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2007)
168 Press Release, Valero to Acquire Premcor in $8 Billion Transaction (Apr.
25, 2005), available at http://www.valero.com/NewsRoom/News+Releases/
NR_20050425.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007).
169 Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 4 (2006)
170 Id. at 3 (quoting National Soc'y of Prof I En'rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) and State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10. )
171 N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. U.S., 356 US 1, 5 (1957).
172 Texaco, 547 U.S. at 3 (citing State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10.)
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judged to be in compliance with the Sherman Act if the conduct sur-
rounding the unlawful activity is deemed to justify it.' 3
Clearly then, courts that favor a rule of reason standard over
per se condone otherwise uncompetitive actions. The February 2006
Supreme Court case, Texaco v. Dagher, where two competitors, Shell
and Texaco formed a joint venture, Equilon, to unilaterally set prices
that the venture charged customers, is an example. 74 As an amicus
brief filed by the American Antitrust Institute explained:
Evidence suggests that Shell and Texaco officials had de-
liberately refrained from discussing brand pricing prior to
the formation of the venture "because of anti-trust con-
cerns." . . .[o]f greatest significance, Respondents offered
evidence that Equilon sharply raised the price of its gaso-
line, at a time when crude oil prices were stable or declin-
ing... Shell and Texaco were not seeking to create a more
efficient competitor in a competitive marketplace, but to
profit by lessening competition between the two former ri-
vals. '' 75
But because the Court relied on a rule of reason analysis, this
anti-competitive practice was deemed to be in compliance with the
Sherman Act.
VI. Natural Markets In Need of Stronger Regulations,
Too 1
76
While the CFTC regulates the natural gas futures markets, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is in charge of regulating
other aspects of natural gas markets. The FERC has a legal mandate
to ensure that electricity prices under its jurisdiction are "just and rea-
sonable,"' 177 but, there is no such "fair price" standard for natural gas.
As natural gas continues to have a bigger impact on the U.S. econ-
173 See Id.
174 Id. at 4. See Peter Carstensen, Using Dagher to Refine the Analysis of
Mergers and Joint Ventures in the Petroleum Industry and Beyond, 19 LOY
CONSUMER L.REv. 447 (2007) for a full discussion of Dagher and its implications.
115 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute at 3, 6, Texaco v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006), available at www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/
files/465.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
176 See generally Consumer Concerns with Natural Gas, supra note 1; Need for
Stronger Regulation of U.S. Gas Markets, supra note 1.
177 16 U.S.C.A 824a-3 (2005).
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omy-not to mention setting the de facto price of electricity due to its
use as fuel for power-legislation establishing a "just and reason-
able" standard for all natural gas production should be considered.
Although FERC does regulate the transportation of natural gas
through pipelines, and can enforce "just and reasonable" rates, this is
only a small portion of what ultimately determines the price of natu-
ral gas.
1 78
The largest portion, production, was deregulated by two Con-
gressional acts. First, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 phased-in
the removal of most wellhead price controls. 179 Second, the 1989
Wellhead Decontrol Act, ended the last remaining price controls.1
80
The solution is to extend FERC regulation over wellhead
prices, which would include subjecting producers to "just and reason-
able" standards-just as FERC has the current authority to subject
electricity producers to 'just and reasonable" standards.' 8
Indeed, the National Association of Gas Consumers, a coali-
tion of municipal gas systems, filed a complaint with FERC in 2001
arguing that skyrocketing natural gas prices were not "just and rea-
sonable," and requested that FERC either: a) set an emergency na-
tionwide price ceiling; or b) initiate an investigation into whether or
not refunds could be ordered for those prices above the "just and rea-
sonable" standard. 1
82
FERC dismissed the complaint noting that: "[a] number of
parties contend the Commission should also take action to limit the
prices at which natural gas can be sold. However, under the Wellhead
Decontrol Act, and the Commission regulations implementing that
Act, natural gas prices have been effectively decontrolled. Therefore,
the Commission declines to take the requested action on the instant
complaints."' 183
Amending the Natural Gas Act'84 to expand FERC's "just and
reasonable" jurisdiction over wellhead prices would help correct this
error. Changing this statute to include "the production or gathering of
natural gas" would help hold natural gas producers accountable.
118 15 USC § 717c
179 Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, codified as 15 U.S.C.
3301, et. seq.
180 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. 10 1-60.
181 16 U.S.C.A §844a-3 (2005).
182 Docket RPO1-223, available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/
183 id.
184 15 USC § 717 (2005).
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
cently ruled that the FERC has broader power than it currently exer-
cises to force energy companies to provide refunds to consumers for
overcharging.' 85 The ability of FERC to order such refunds, how-
ever, is contingent upon the existence of the "just and reasonable"
standard enshrined in the Federal Power Act.' 86 Without such a stan-
dard for natural gas, consumers are left unprotected. 
87
Solutions
" Strengthen antitrust laws by empowering the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to crack down on unilateral
withholding and other anti-competitive actions by
oil companies. 18
* Congress must legislate stronger merger guidelines
to prevent the kind of consolidation permitted by
the FTC over the last few years, including mandat-
ing that cases brought under the Sherman Act must
use the per se standard when evaluating violations
of the Act. 1
89
* The Department of Energy should implement a
Strategic Refinery Reserve (SRR), to complement
the successful Strategic Petroleum Reserve, such as
the one proposed in S.1979. Refined products pro-
duced at the facility could be placed in reserve to be
released in times of natural disasters or price spikes.
An SRR would prove useful in diminishing the abil-
ity of oil companies to engage in unilateral with-
holding, as the SRR could be used to release sup-
plies to satisfy the needs of consumers, thereby
lowering prices.'90
185 Pub. Utilities Comm'n of the State of Cal. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of
Nev., 462 F.3d 1029, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2006).
18 6 Id. at 1060.
187 See Id.
188 See supra notes 141-145.
189 See supra Section IV
'90 See supra notes 141-45.
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0 Reregulate natural gas markets by granting the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission "just and rea-
sonable" rate authority over natural gas wellhead
prices. 191
VII. Taxing Oil Company Profits
Apologists for record oil company profits argue that the com-
panies need and deserve record windfalls to provide the necessary
market incentive to invest more money into increased energy produc-
tion.
Public Citizen's analysis of oil company profits and their in-
vestments show that oil companies spend unprecedented sums on
benefits for their shareholders in the form of stock buybacks and
dividend payments and do not adequately invest in sustainable energy
that is necessary to end America's addiction to oil. 92 Since January
2005, the top five oil companies have spent $153 billion buying back
stock and paying out dividends-more than the companies spent on
capital investment.1 93 This not only represents a huge transfer of
wealth from consumers to oil company investors, but shows that oil
companies are squandering opportunities to use their record profits to
make investments that will end America's addiction to oil.
With nearly $1 trillion of combined assets tied up in extract-
ing, refining and marketing petroleum and natural gas, the five big oil
companies' business models are designed to squeeze every last cent
of profit out of their monopoly control over fossil fuels. They simply
will not make significant investments in anything else until their mo-
nopoly control over oil is spent.
Additionally, the monopoly control translates into unprece-
dented profits. When communicating to the general public and law-
makers, oil companies downplay these record earnings by calculating
profits differently than they do when they speak to Wall Street and
shareholders. Conversing with lawmakers and the general public, the
oil industry highlights the small profit margins, typically around 8 to
10 percent, that measuring net income as a share of total revenues
produces.
But when ExxonMobil and other energy companies talk to in-
vestors and Wall Street, they do not highlight the small profit margins
which measure net income as a share of the total revenue. For exam-
191 See supra notes 164 -170.
192 See Slocum, Hot Profits, supra note 53 at 13.
193 Id.
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ple, an excerpt from the ExxonMobil's 2005 annual report states:
"ExxonMobil believes that return on average capital employed
(ROCE) is the most relevant metric for measuring financial perform-
ance in a capital-intensive business such as" petroleum.' 
94
ExxonMobil's 2006 earning report shows that that the com-
pany's global operations enjoyed a 32 percent rate of return on aver-
age capital employed. 95 ChevronTexaco reported a 23 percent rate of
return on average capital employed in 2006.196
With oil companies not taking action to protect America's
middle- and low-income families from the high-energy prices that
fuel their profits, oil industry subsidies should be repealed with the
proceeds invested in renewables, alternative fuels, energy efficiency
and mass transit. Indeed, HR 6, which passed the House on January
18, 2007 repeals $14 billion in oil company subsidies over the next
decade and dedicates the money to a new "Strategic Energy Effi-
ciency and Renewables Reserve."'' 9
7
Naysayers argue that increasing taxes on oil companies or en-
acting a Windfall Profits Tax did not work the last time it was
tried. 19 The Windfall Profits Tax of 1980-88 was ineffective not be-
cause of the tax itself, but because oil prices fell shortly after enact-
ment of the tax due to global events unrelated to U.S. tax policy.
Congress enacted the Windfall Profits Tax in 1980 after U.S. oil
company profits surged following the Iranian Revolution and the re-
sulting Iran-Iraq war, which caused oil prices to increase from
$14/barrel in 1979 to $35/barrel by January 1981. But after 1981,
crude oil prices steadily decreased until completely bottoming out in
1986-87 as demand fell and as other oil producing countries in-
creased their output. As the value of the commodity subject to the tax
fell, the effectiveness of the tax diminished.
But that was then. The Wall Street Journal recently con-
cluded that "a crash looks unlikely now, both because supplies re-
main tight and because of the large volumes of money that investors
'94 ExxonMobile 2005 Summary Annual Report 19, available at
www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/sar-2005.pdf.
195 Exxon Mobil Corp. Form 10-K at 30 (2006),
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000119312507042435/d 10k.htm
196 Press Release, Chevron Reports Third Quarter Net Income of $5 Billion, up
40% from $3.6 Billion in Third Quarter 2005, 2 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/irol/13/130102/IRhome/3Q_Release.pdf
197 H.R. 6, 1 10 th Cong. Sec. 1 (2007), see also
www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2362 for more information
198 American Petroleum Institute, Windfall Profit Tax, (2006)
www.api.org/policy/tax/upload/WhitePaper2004_060CRSupdated.pdf
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are pouring into oil markets."'' 99
In addition to a Windfall Profits Tax, Congress needs to re-
form the royalty system imposed on companies drilling for oil and
natural gas on public land. One-third of the oil and natural gas pro-
duced in the United States comes from land owned by the taxpayers,
but royalty payments by oil companies have not kept up with the ex-
plosion in energy prices and profits enjoyed by the industry. 20 0 A re-
cent Inspector General audit of the U.S. Department of the Interior's
Minerals Management Service concludes that oil companies are
pumping oil from federal land without paying adequate royalties to
taxpayers for the privilege. 20 1 The report cites widespread cronyism,
ethical breaches, decimated auditing staff and overreliance on infor-
mation rovided by Big Oil as culprits in the oil industry give-
away. 20Meanwhile the Justice Department unexpectedly announced
the welcome news that it has initiated criminal investigations into the
Interior Department's oversight of oil companies.20 3 Taxpayers must
be fairly compensated for allowing oil companies the privilege of ex-
tracting resources from federally-owned land.
Conclusion
This era of high energy prices and record oil company profits
is not a simple case of supply and demand. As the evidence indi-
cates, consolidation of energy infrastructure assets, combined with
weak or non-existent regulatory oversight of energy trading markets,
provides opportunity for energy companies and financial institutions
to price-gouge Americans. Forcing consumers to suffer from an ine-
lastic demand to continue to pay high prices-in part fueled by un-
competitive actions-not only hurts consumers economically, but en-
vironmentally as well, as the oil companies and energy traders
enjoying record profits are not investing those earnings into sustain-
able energy or alternatives to our addiction to oil. As a result, Amer-
'99 Bhushan Bahree & Ann Davis, Oil Settles Above $70 a Barrel, Despite In-
ventories at 8-year High, Wall STREET J., April 18, 2006.
200 See DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT
REPORT: MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE'S COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCESS ii, 2,
3 (Dec. 2006), available at www.doioig.gov/upload/2007-G-00011.pdf; Edmund
Andres, Report Says Oil Royalties Go Unpaid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006.
201 Id,
202 Id.
203 Edmund L. Andrews, Criminal Inquiries Look at US. Oil-Gas Unit, The
New York Times, Dec.15, 2006.
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ica's consumption of fossil fuels continues to grow, and the impacts
of global warming take their toll on our environment. America's ad-
diction to oil is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions that
cause global warming. Forty-four percent of America's world-
leading carbon dioxide emissions are from the burning of petroleum
products.
20 4
Reforms to strengthen regulatory oversight over America's
energy trading markets and bolster anti-trust enforcement are needed
to restore true competition to America's oil and gas markets.
204 See generally, Energy Information Association, U.S. Emissions
Data,vwww.eia.doe.gov/environment.html (last visited May 21, 2007).
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